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BEYOND EQUALITY AND
DISCRIMINATION†
Martha Albertson Fineman *
ABSTRACT
The societal frame of the “economically disadvantaged” is rooted in a distinction between
a conceptual status of equality and the actuality of discrimination and disadvantage. This
paradigm provides the governing logic for both criticism and justification of the status quo.
This Article questions whether and to what extent this equality/antidiscrimination logic
has lost its effectiveness as a critical tool and what, if anything, should be the foundation
of the rationale that supplements or even replaces it.
I. INTRODUCTION
The theme of this Article for the SMU Law Review Forum focuses us on the
challenges faced by the “economically disadvantaged” in the past decade and in
the future. This framing is rooted in a distinction between that conceptual status
of equality and the actuality of discrimination and disadvantage. This is the lens
through which contemporary legal culture tends to assess the nature and effect of
existing laws and determines the necessary direction of reform. As such, this
paradigm provides the governing logic for both criticism and justification of the
status quo. It is rooted in an understanding of the significance of the human being
and a belief in their fundamental parity under law that also asserts the inherent
value of individual liberty and autonomy, and thus is skeptical of state
intervention into the “private” sphere of life.
I believe that one of the most significant questions for the twenty-first century
for those concerned with “the disadvantaged” has to be whether and to what
extent this equality/antidiscrimination logic has lost its effectiveness as a critical
tool and what, if anything, should be the foundation of the rationale that
supplements or even replaces it. To raise questions about the current dominant
paradigm is not to argue that equality and antidiscrimination are not important
or necessary concepts. Equality and antidiscrimination were unarguably essential
† Portions of this Article are based on a previous piece by the author. See Martha Albertson
Fineman, Vulnerability and Social Justice, 53 VAL. U. L. REV. 341 (2019). [Ed.’s Note].
* Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law and Founding Director of the Vulnerability
Initiative, Emory University and Leeds University (U.K.).
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steps in the evolution of a just society. Prior to the mid-twentieth century, formal
rules, as well as functioning norms, were built on assertions of fundamental
differences among groups defined by gender, race, and other characteristics. These
distinctive group categories also established a world of hierarchical, legalized
identities in which some were susceptible to different, often demeaning
treatment. However, with the formal distinctions now removed and equal access
the norm,1 it becomes apparent that the problems in society often transcend
discrimination and exclusion from social institutions. Indeed, there may be
substantial problems with those institutions and their organization not revealed
by the jurisprudential logic that flows from an equality/antidiscrimination
paradigm, which may place obstacles on the ability to remedy (or even address)
existing inequalities. 2
An equality model or nondiscrimination mandate certainly remains the
appropriate response in many instances: one person, one vote, and equal pay for
equal work are areas where equality seems clearly suitable. However, equality is
less helpful—and may even be an unjust measure—when applied in situations of
inescapable or inevitable inequality where differing levels of authority and power
are appropriate, such as in defining the legal relationship between parent and
child or employer and employee. Such relationships have historically been
relegated to the “private” sphere of life—whether family or market—away from state
regulation.
When explicitly addressed, situations of inevitable inequality are typically
handled in law and policy either by imposing a fabricated equivalence between
the individuals or by declaring that an equality mandate does not apply because
the individuals to be compared are positioned differently. 3 An example of the
imposition of fictitious equality in response to inevitable inequality is evident in
situations involving parties who occupy obviously unequal bargaining positions,
like the contract that is fabricated in the employment context. 4 The distinction in
the legal treatment of children as compared with adults also exemplifies a
differently positioned resolution for unequal legal treatment. In both instances,
state responsibility for ensuring equitable treatment for differently positioned

1. This argument is developed more fully in Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability and
Inevitable Inequality, 4 OSLO L. REV. 133 (2017).
2. This is reflected in the difficulties with affirmative action and other “remedial” plans that
propose unequal treatment in order to address existing inequalities. See Martha Albertson Fineman,
Equality and Difference – The Restrained State, 66 ALA. L. REV. 609, 626 (2014).
3. Moreover, equality implies a comparison that leads to the problematic question: Equal to
whom? In the case of women, are male norms and standards the appropriate measure? Such an
assimilationist approach to equality presumes socially and culturally imposed roles—obligations and
burdens are similar or equal in nature as regards women and men. If this is not the case, equal
treatment will often result in further consolidation of existing, unequal power relationships,
effectively reinforcing the very gender system that feminists oppose. In addition, the idea of “choice”
may suggest to some that existing inequalities show not a failure of equality per se but are simply the
result of different life choices freely made by “autonomous” men and women. If women choose to
devote more time to family and relationships, rather than investing their energies in the labor market,
the resulting gender disparities are merely the neutral result of differing choices made by equally
autonomous and free adults. See generally id.
4. These are typically contracts of adhesion or involve corporate entities and individuals in a
situation with a predictable inequality of knowledge, bargaining power, and access to legal resources.
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individuals is minimized or obscured within the overriding framework of
equality. 5
II. RETHINKING THE PARADIGM—VULNERABILITY THEORY
Law is both inherently a social endeavor and a primary instrument of
accomplishing social justice. Laws establish and regulate duties, obligations,
rights, and privileges applicable to all members of a society, as well as define
relationships with each other and with the state and its institutions. Politicians
and philosophers addressing the role and function of law can and do differ when
it comes to theories of governance, but there should be a shared recognition of
the significance of our understanding of what it means to be human. Laws are
drawn with a created legal subject in mind—an imagined ordinary being who is
the abstract subject of law. 6 Our ideas about what it means to be human and how
the state or collective should be constructed influence how we shape legal
relationships and social institutions, as well as inform what we consider to be
justice within those arrangements and institutions. 7 This dialectical relationship
between the empirical and the ideal is a starting point to apprehend the law not
as mere reflection of society but as constitutive of the material forces which guide
its own reproduction. 8
Our contemporary legal subject is posited as an autonomous and independent
being whose primary demand is for liberty or freedom from state interference. 9
He claims a right to autonomy to govern his own life while at the same time
asserting his freedom from responding to the needs of others, who should be
equally independent and self-sufficient. 10 This Enlightenment vision of legal and
5. On reflection, it becomes apparent that many, if not most, social or institutional
relationships are relationships of inherent inequality. See Fineman, Vulnerability and Inevitable
Inequality, supra note 1, at 134–35.
6. Defining this is a matter of selecting what are essential human qualities, which can then be
used to set expectations and aspirations attainable under a rule of law.
7. See, e.g., HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 2 (1967)
(explaining how the method of social theorists differs from natural scientists and the importance of
acknowledging the network of concepts).
8. In this endeavor, I am indebted to the framework provided by Merton’s “theories of the
middle range,” in the sense that they are “intermediate to general theories of social systems which are
too remote from particular classes of social behavior, organization and change to account for what is
observed and to those detailed orderly descriptions of particulars that are not generalized at all.”
ROBERT K. MERTON, On Sociological Theories of the Middle Range, in ON THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY:
FIVE ESSAYS, OLD AND NEW 39, 39 (1967).
9. See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the
Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008) [hereinafter Fineman, Anchoring Equality].
10. I intentionally use the male pronoun here because the political subject that governs our
current institutional imagination is based on a limited notion of the human experience—one that
reflects the understanding of the male, white, property-owning or tax-paying, of a certain age and/or
religion and free framer of the U.S. Constitution. Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, certain qualifiers were removed, and political legal subjectivity formally grew to encompass
previously excluded groups. However, this eighteenth-century legal subject continues to influence the
modern legal subject. “He” retains many of the secondary characteristics that formed perceptions of
the needs and political sensibilities of an eighteenth-century male citizen sheltered by institutions
such as the patriarchal family and the privileges of a master-servant mentality. See generally Martha
Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 B.U.
L. REV. 1713 (2012).
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political subjectivity has given us legal concepts such as the “reasonable man” and
also forms the basis for the rational, self-interested agent in economic theory. 11
The liberal legal subject embodies an ideal of abstract equality or fundamental
sameness where any differences among men are deemed to be legally or politically
insignificant.
This liberal legal subject is a fully functioning adult in charge and capable of
making choices. Unrestrained by the state, he will be rewarded according to his
particular talents and individual efforts. His social relations are defined by
concepts, such as consent, and supported by legal doctrines, such as contract and
property. 12 The attainment of liberal economic roles, such as job creator,
entrepreneur, taxpayer, and (of course) consumer, defines the aspirations and
determines the values for this legal subject. The messy aspects of what it means to
be human, particularly the physical realities of vulnerability and dependency, may
be viewed as a problem, but they are strictly considered to be an individual, not a
societal, problem. Thus, such problems are deemed a personal, rather than public,
responsibility. 13
“Vulnerability theory” challenges this limited and inaccurate vision of legal
subjectivity. It suggests that a legal subject that is primarily defined by vulnerability
and need, rather than exclusively by rationality and liberty, more fully reflects the
human condition. As such, vulnerability theory has the power to disrupt the logic
of personal responsibility and individual liberty built on the liberal stereotype of
an independent and autonomous individual. Recognition of human vulnerability
mandates that the neoliberal legal subject be replaced with the vulnerable legal
subject, even as a responsive state is substituted for the restrained state of liberal
imagination. 14
The rethinking of legal subjectivity and state responsibility is an important
social justice project. When we place the vulnerable subject at the center of our
theorizing, it becomes clear that there is a collective or social injury that inevitably
arises from a state unresponsive to the universal and constant human condition
of vulnerability and dependency. 15 The injury arises from profound negligence or
disregard on the part of the state to attend to human vulnerability in creating its

11. This liberal legal subject is based in the Lockean notion on equality of the same inalienable
natural rights. See Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 9, at 2–3. This is also the basis for law and
economics theories that came to dominate in the late twentieth century and is commonly associated
with the economic philosophy of the “Chicago School.” See generally RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (9th ed. 2014). For the influence of the law and economics movement
in the United States, see DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE 41–76 (2011). For a critique from
feminist scholarship, see FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, & SOCIETY
(Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005).
12. Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 1419–21
(2001).
13. See id. at 1405–06.
14. Fineman, Equality and Difference, supra note 2, at 626; Fineman, Vulnerability and Inevitable
Inequality, supra note 1, at 149.
15. Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in Law and Politics,
in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS 13,
21 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Greer eds., 2013); Martha Albertson Fineman, The
Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 266–69 (2010).
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institutions and defining the social relationships that will govern society. 16
Vulnerability theory is also a legal project that will bring all areas of law, not just
those focused on civil rights, under social-justice scrutiny.
A. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE HUMAN?
Vulnerability theory began by asking a fundamental question: What does it
mean to be human? 17 In answering this question, we must identify the essential
aspects of human beings—those characteristics, experiences, or situations that are
universal and define the human condition. 18 The answer to this question in
vulnerability theory is, of course, vulnerability. Vulnerability is located in the fact
that we are embodied beings. Our bodies are inevitably and constantly susceptible
to changes—both positive and negative, developmental, and episodic over the life
course, and this has implications for our social well-being as well. 19 Note that
human vulnerability is not set forth as a normative concept. It is descriptive,
representing irrefutably empirical observations about the nature and substance of
the embodied human experience.
As embodied beings, humans constantly experience changes over time, which
include not only the possibility of bodily harm, injury, or decline but may also be
positive and generative. For example, developmental changes for an individual
can lead to increased strength, growth, wisdom, and maturity, as well as provoking
creativity and relationships of fulfillment and satisfaction. On a societal level, the
reality of our susceptibility to bodily change over time necessitates the creation of
relationships of care and caring upon which we are dependent 20 as infants and
16. Fineman, Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in Law and Politics, supra note 15, at
20–21.
17. See id. at 21. Vulnerability theory draws a distinction between what is the essence of the
human condition (which reflects the biological and developmental realities of our bodies) and how
we understand human nature (which is largely a product of history, geography, and culture—in other
words, it varies over time and place and is socially produced).
18. Vulnerability theory posits vulnerability as universal and constant but also recognizes that
there are differences among individuals. “Horizontal” differences are observed if we take a slice of
society at any given time and note the differences in embodiment, such as race, gender, ability, and
other differences. There are also differences in social standing and status. These differences do not
alter the fundamental vulnerability that marks all bodies but have certainly served to provoke
profound social advantage or disadvantage. Thus, horizontal differences have been the main subject
of antidiscrimination and inclusion laws. An additional set of differences may be thought of as
“vertical”—occurring within each individual over the life course as we move from infant to elderly.
These differences are not well-addressed in law and theory. Typically, children and some elderly or
disabled individuals are clustered into “vulnerable populations” and stigmatized as either in need of
protection or lacking capacity, creating a “special” legal identity for those within the group. Other
“vulnerable populations,” such as at-risk youth, may be subjected to discipline or punishment. This
Article will not explore the reconciliation of the universal vulnerable subject with what I have called
the “paradox” of particularity, but those interested in this aspect should see Fineman, Equality and
Difference, supra note 2, and Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth, 23
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 307 (2014).
19. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, in TRANSCENDING BOUNDARIES OF LAW: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL
THEORY 161, 166–70 (Martha Albertson Fineman ed., 2011).
20. I view both vulnerability and dependence as universal, reflecting the shared human
condition that mandates that, of necessity, we are social beings. These terms do not designate
individuals as aberrant and deficient but, quite the contrary, exemplify the human condition.
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children, as well as the social institutions and relationships upon which we are
inevitably enmeshed as adults. 21
While vulnerability theory begins with vulnerability, it does not end there. In
fact, it is the implications of human vulnerability that are the most significant part
of the theory for legal and political thought. Because we are embodied creatures,
we are also dependent on social institutions and relationships throughout the life
course.
B. INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN VULNERABILITY
Ultimately, of more significance to the development of the theory than the
description of human vulnerability is a second theoretical question, one that has
normative implications: If to be human is to be universally and constantly
vulnerable, how should this recognition inform the structure and operation of
our society and its institutions? To answer this question, it is necessary to reflect
initially upon the whole idea of society, its purpose, and its justification. Reflecting
a dawning neoliberal perspective, Margaret Thatcher, in a 1987 interview in
Women’s Own Magazine, famously proclaimed there was no such thing as society:
They are casting their problems at society. And, you know, there’s no such
thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families.
And no government can do anything except through people, and people
must look after themselves first. It is our duty to look after ourselves and
then, also, to look after our neighbours.22
Clearly, she was making a political, not a sociological, statement reflecting her
view on state responsibility (or lack thereof). However, the idea of society and how
it functions in critical theory is not always obvious, and it is important to explicitly
reveal the assumptions that are made. We know societies are not all the same, but
they may nonetheless have universal, shared characteristics. What are they?
Obviously, any society has to be intergenerational if it is going to perpetuate itself.
Every society needs a means of organizing itself and establishing the rules that will
guide individual interactions with each other, as well as establishing the
appropriate relationship between the individual and the state. In addition, every
society must, of necessity, devise social institutions and relationships that respond
to the realities of the human condition, which means responding to human
vulnerability and dependency. 23
These two assertions about society are at the heart of vulnerability theory. The
social institutions and relationships that a society forms must transcend not only
the specific interests of particular individuals and groups but must also have
21. The point is that although the institutions and relationships upon which we depend change
over time—from family to educational and employment systems, for example—the reality of our social
dependency is constant.
22. Margaret Thatcher: A Life in Quotes, GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2013, 8:38 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/apr/08/margaret-thatcher-quotes
[https://perma.cc/7P7S-Z7W7].
23. As we have seen, contemporary politics has dictated the market and its institutions as the
mechanism to provide for human needs, as well as preserving individual liberty. See infra Section II.C.
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concern for the intergenerational needs of society. This societal perspective
defines a preeminent social justice challenge. Vulnerability theory teaches us that
human beings are all inevitably embedded within the social—located throughout
our lives in particular systems of social organization. The social nature of those
institutions and relationships form the basis for state or collective responsibility.
This responsibility cannot initially or primarily be understood only in terms of
individual well-being. Social justice responsibility must be intergenerational and
directed to the systems of institutions and relationships developed by a society to
maintain general human well-being and flourishing. 24 We cannot adequately
assess what is just on an individual or group basis without considering the justice
of the fundamental social order. The societal problems of general organization
and order must define state responsibility in the first instance.
In defining this collective responsibility, the collective reality of human
vulnerability and the physical and social dependency that it inevitably generates
must be of central concern. In particular, the social implications of dependency
are vitally important in defining state responsibility. 25 Dependency is most evident
when we are infants and children, but while we may be more or less dependent at
any given stage, it is present in some form and to some degree throughout our
lives. 26
C. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND RESILIENCE
Understanding vulnerability as inevitably arising from our embodiment and
inescapably necessitating the creation of social institutions should make it clear
that there is no position of either invulnerability or independence. Fortunately,
however, there is resilience. Resilience is centrally important in a vulnerability
analysis. Resilience is not a naturally occurring and variable characteristic of
individuals. Nor is it achieved only by individual accomplishment and effort.
Rather, resilience is a product of social relationships and institutions. Human
beings are not born resilient. Instead, resilience is produced over time, within
social structures, and under societal conditions over which individuals may have
little or no control. 27
Resilience is found in the material, cultural, social, and existential resources
that allow individuals to respond to their vulnerability (and dependencies).28
24. Distortions within the system, such as impermissible discrimination, can be addressed after
the general functioning is determined to be justice.
25. Dependency is the realization or actualization of human vulnerability and can come in
economic, physical, psychological, or other institutional forms. Dependency has typically been used
as a highly stigmatized term, particularly in the context of “welfare reform.” Dependency and the idea
of cycles of intergenerational dependency were used to justify draconian cuts to an already meager
safety net for poor women and their children in the United States. However, single mothers who
attained that status through divorce could look to their ex-husbands for resources, remaining
dependent on him rather than the state. Nonetheless, the gendered social roles and expectations
within the family affected the way women were seen and received in society, independent of their
own family situation or motherhood status. See Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The
Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2204–06 (1995).
26. See id. at 2200–01.
27. See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, supra note 15, at 269–73.
28. The list of resources is an expansion on the list of assets developed in Fineman, Anchoring
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Resilience is measured by an individual’s ability to survive or recover from harm
or setbacks that inevitably occur over the life course. Resilience has positive
manifestations as well. Resilient individuals can form relationships, undertake
transactions, take advantage of opportunities, or take risks in life—confident that
if they fail the challenge or meet unexpected obstacles, they are likely to have the
means and ability to recover. In other words, resilience allows us to respond to
life—not only to survive but also to thrive within the circumstances in which we
find ourselves.
Institutions are the mechanisms whereby individuals can accrue the resources
they need to have resilience. The fact that a vulnerability analysis brings the life
course into focus is also important. Resilience-conferring institutions operate both
simultaneously and sequentially in society. That they are sequential is significant
because it illuminates how failing to gain resources or resilience successfully in
one stage can fundamentally affect the ability of an individual to succeed in
another. An inadequate education will impair the ability to secure employment
and accumulate material goods, which will also affect things later in life, like
health, family formation, and prospects in old age. The movement into a new
phase depends on successful accomplishment of the tasks set in the earlier stage,
and it may be difficult to recover if that does not happen. 29
The fact that institutions operate simultaneously is also significant when
thinking about resilience. The family, the market, the financial and educational
systems, and so on are the intersecting institutions where we accumulate the
material, cultural, social, and existential resources that give us resilience as
individuals. Therefore, resilience gained through one institutional or relational
arrangement can offset or mitigate disadvantages in others (and vice versa). For
instance, strong family compensates for weak education, while violent or abusive
family undermines advantages of strong education. 30
While it may not be explicitly focused on the vulnerability of human beings,
the current political order is not dismissive of the need for social institutions.31
Policy pronouncements, legislative histories, party platforms, and political
rhetoric have routinely recognized and celebrated the important position and
function of institutions and institutional roles in society.32 Economic or market
Equality, supra note 9, at 13–15, based on the four types of assets identified in PEADAR KIRBY,
VULNERABILITY AND VIOLENCE: THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION (2006). In discussing resilience,
Kirby builds on earlier definitions that understood resilience as “enabling units such as individuals,
households, communities and nations to withstand internal and external shocks.” Fineman,
Anchoring Equality, supra note 9, at 13 n.34 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting KIRBY, supra,
at 55).
29. See Martha Albertson Fineman & George Shepherd, Homeschooling: Choosing Parental Rights
over Children’s Interests, 46 U. BALT. L. REV. 57, 83–88 (2016).
30. See Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 9, at 15–16.
31. Liberal political rhetoric reflects a greater recognition that governmental assistance is
necessary when it comes to provision of basic needs like health care and education than its more
conservative counterparts. However, both guard and preserve the public-private divide.
32. See generally DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS
OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2012) (showing the relevance of political and economic
institutions for development); JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS:
HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS
(2011) (exploring the relationship of political institutions to inequality and wealth concentration).
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institutions are lauded as producing the economic well-being of society, and the
individuals controlling them are cast as wealth and job creators—entrepreneurs
paving the path for economic growth and prosperity for the entire nation. 33 The
family is praised for its role in raising the next generation of citizens and caring
for those at the end of life. Parents are lauded for their self-sacrificing actions, and
the self-sufficient (marital) family is valorized as both a moral and an economic
ideal, uniquely qualified to attend to dependency and the needs of its members. 34
The political and policy perception is that these institutions, among others,
have a central and essential role in organizing and reproducing society, as well as
providing for individuals—which serves as the rationale for protecting them from
state interference. 35 Obviously, this perception that institutions are necessary is
correct. However, we must modify the current political dogma that places these
institutions within a “private sphere,” distinguishing them from a public arena in
which state action and responsibility are the norms. The failure to recognize the
public purpose of these institutions (and the corresponding public responsibility
for them) is not only misguided but also detrimental to the functioning of society
and the welfare of many individuals within it.
That these constructed entities are deemed “private” institutions—even though
we enact laws to facilitate their creation; determine their shape, terms, and
responsibilities; and ease their functioning—is a paradox. 36 They are creatures of
33. Particularly in modern capitalist societies, i.e., market-oriented economies, private
corporations are the main actors in deciding what, when, and how much economic well-being is
produced and also are our main employers and taxpayers. In the words of Lindblom, they are a kind
of “public official[,]” considering that “jobs, prices, production, growth, the standard of living, and
the economic security of everyone all rest in their hands.” CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND
MARKETS: THE WORLD’S POLITICAL ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 172 (1977) (emphasis added).
34. The family is the quintessentially “private” institution—the sphere that is theoretically
protected from intervention by the state. However, paradoxically, it is also a heavily regulated entity,
with the state (through law) defining what the core family connection is and who may attain it under
what circumstances. The state also defines the consequences of family relationship and controls the
exit as well as the entrance into those relationships. I have discussed the invisibility of dependence
within the family and the need for a collective responsibility towards care in MARTHA ALBERTSON
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY
TRAGEDIES (1995).
35. See generally Janet Halley, What is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
1, 1–6 (2011) (providing an overview of the development of “family law exceptionalism”); Janet
Halley, What is Family Law? A Genealogy Part II, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 189, 189–95 (2011) (arguing
that family law fundamentally differs from the “market” and its laws).
36. Robert Dahl observed that “without the protection of a dense network of laws enforced by
public governments, the largest American corporation could not exist for a day.” GAR ALPEROVITZ
& LEW DALY, UNJUST DESERTS: HOW THE RICH ARE TAKING OUR COMMON INHERITANCE 138
(2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST
DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL 184 (1982)). Dahl also noted that the view of economic
institutions as “private” is an “ill fit” for their “social and public” nature. Id. at 139 (quoting DAHL,
supra, at 185); see also Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence,
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 15 n.5 (2000) (“The
characterization of the market in this public/private scheme is interesting. It is cast as public vis-à-vis
the family, but private vis-à-vis the state, seeming to gain the advantage of each category. In this regard,
it is interesting to note that when the comparison is of market versus family, the ‘private’ sphere of
the family is subject to heavy public regulation, mostly because it retains aspects of ‘status’ and is not
governed by contract. In contrast, the ‘public’ arena of the marketplace is governed by bodies of
designated ‘private’ law, such as contract. These contrary characterizations have ideological
nuances.”).
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law, brought into being by doctrines set out in corporate, family, property,
corporate, employment, tax, trade, welfare, and other laws. The law determines
the nature of the relationships between individuals within these essential social
institutions, such as parent-child, employer-employee, shareholder-consumer, and
so on. 37
Creation of social institutions and relationships also involves defining the
relationship between the state, the institutions it creates in law, and the
individual. Laws and legal principles form or constrain the ongoing scope of state
responsibility for social institutions once they have been created. In the United
States, the idea of ongoing state responsibility is viewed as an exception when it
comes to social institutions, particularly the market or family. For example, in the
business arena, the notions of the “free market” and the “efficiency” inherent in
competition are raised consistently as barriers to state regulation and oversight. 38
We have fashioned doctrines of “family privacy” and “parental rights” that deter
government participation in significant and consequential decisions affecting the
present and future well-being of children. 39 This default position of the “private”
ordering system for essential societal institutions must be adjusted by recognizing
the necessity of ongoing public monitoring of and oversight for these institutions.
This oversight and advocacy for needed adjustments should be primary focuses of
social justice scholarship.
By shaping essential social institutions and the relationships within them, the
law dictates the basic organization of society, allocating power and privilege as well
as determining the means for individual and societal well-being. Both individuals
and society are ultimately dependent on the successful and fair operation of
society’s institutions. The relationship between the individual and society is
symbiotic and mutually dependent. As indicated in the preceding section, the
concept of derivative dependence is important here. If we are to fulfill the social
roles we occupy within society, we must be able to rely on its institutions. If society
is to flourish, it must rely on the success of the institutions and individuals who
comprise it. Individual and collective reliance on social relationships and
institutions mandate that the state monitor these essential social arrangements
and make adjustments when they are not operating equitably. This includes those

37. For this reason, these are examples of laws that should be consistently and rigorously
examined with principles of social justice in mind. Vulnerability theory refers to these relationships
as social identities. They express societal expectations that govern the interaction and consequences
within institutions. See generally Jonathan Fineman, A Vulnerability Approach to Private Ordering
Employment, in VULNERABILITY AND THE LEGAL ORGANIZATION OF WORK 13 (Martha Albertson
Fineman & Jonathan W. Fineman eds., 2018) (for employment context). It is also important to see
how social identities may intersect in unjust ways. For example, how does the social role defined for
the employee conflict with that defined for the parent? Note that this is not a traditional identitybased analysis. It is not the gender of the employee that is relevant, but the societal task associated
with the social role (caretaker versus employee).
38. Politicians use arguments of liberty, equality, and contract in drafting the legal terms and
consequences of employment as primarily of private concern. See id. at 14–15. The same principles
are used to support the organization of corporate relationships so as to thwart regulations and
oversight.
39. One example of how a vulnerability analysis might address this is found in Fineman &
Shepherd, supra note 29, at 57.
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institutions that are now classified as private, as well as those deemed public. 40 At
most, social institutions can only be considered to be quasi-private.
III. CONCLUSION
Vulnerability theory, built around our shared vulnerability and dependence,
illuminates why we first need to consider general legal institutions and
relationships in determining social justice. By placing the vulnerable subject at the
center of its inquiry, vulnerability theory requires critical inquiry beginning with
a consideration of how society generally structures its institutions and
relationships through law and policy. In urging us to do this before looking at
how specific individuals or groups fare within those social arrangements, the
theory seeks to define and apply a legislative or administrative set of decisionmaking ethics rather than setting forth a cluster of individual rights to
entitlements. 41 Vulnerability theory is more focused on establishing the
parameters of state responsibility for societal intuitions and relationships than it
is on setting the limits of state intervention.
In taking this approach to state responsibility, vulnerability theory expands our
notion of what constitutes an injury of constitutional significance to include the
gross neglect or willful disregard of circumstances of profound deprivation and
unmet need on the part of some citizens. 42 If social institutions and relationships
are formed to respond to human vulnerability and dependency, then human
vulnerability and dependence should form the foundation of our social compact.
This societal perspective is very different from that found in traditional social
contract theory in defining state responsibility. Traditional social contract
concepts are based on the idea that rational and autonomous individuals consent
to cede some of their naturally endowed liberty to the (restrained) state in
exchange for mutual protection in a Hobbesian world.43 By contrast, vulnerability
theory recognizes state responsibility as arising from the human needs organically
rooted in universal vulnerability and dependency. State responsibility, initially
manifested in the creation of social organization and rules, must continue to
monitor and reform those institutions if they are going to succeed consistent with
principles of social justice.
Importantly, a vulnerability approach to social justice recognizes that the
relationship between the individual and the society is synergetic and, thus,
ongoing. Resilience-conferring institutions operate in integrated and sequential
ways within society, and individual success depends on the successful integration
and operation of those institutions. The role of social institutions for the
40. See generally Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths, supra note 36.
41. This does not mean that an antidiscrimination analysis is not ever appropriate. It is merely
an argument about inclusiveness and positioning in critical thought. If one begins by defining a
problem as one limited to discrimination, the resolution is inclusion of the excluded individual or
group. The general nature and functioning of the social institution and relationships contained
within it may then be neglected or ignored. See Deborah Dinner, Beyond “Best Practices”: EmploymentDiscrimination Law in the Neoliberal Era, 92 IND. L.J. 1059, 1106–07 (2017) (employment context).
42. See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, supra note 15, at 274 n.77.
43. The fact that some individuals will succeed and even thrive in this type of Hobbesian world
is not surprising; they do so by exploiting and dominating others, including governing structures.
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individual also suggests a corresponding societal dependence on the collective
successes of those individuals. Just as no individual can successfully stand apart
from the state and its institutions, the destiny of the state ultimately relies on the
actions of the individuals who constitute it. The reproduction of a just society
requires that law and policy construct and sustain an adequately responsive state—
one that is grounded in vulnerability theory, addresses the range of dependencies
inherent over the life course, and is attentive to all stages of development and
forms of need of the vulnerable subject.

